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INTRODUCTION
The state can impose law from the top down by enacting novel
obligations, as illustrated by most regulatory law; or, alternatively, law
can grow from the bottom up by enforcing social norms.' To illus-
trate from the common law, in the eighteenth century, Lord Mans-
t Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley. I am grateful for comments from Jeffrey Harrison and the participants in
the Cornell Law Review Symposium, The Nature and Sources, Formal and Informal, of Law,
March 1-2, 1997. I am also grateful for comments received at the University of Southern
California Law Faculty Workshop, April 30, 1997; at the annual meeting of the American
Law and Economics Association, May 9, 1997; and from Timur Kuran.
1 The assimilation of bills of exchange and negotiable instruments into the common
law in the eighteenth century is well documented. See, e.g., J. MiLNFS HOLDEN, THE HIS-
TORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 99-144 (1955) (providing the traditional
view of this development). For a revised view, see JAMEs STEVEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HIS-
TORY OF THE LAW OF Bius AND NOTES 210-22 (1995) (stressing that Lord Mansfield im-
mersed himself in the minutiae of business practice in order to extract the best principles
from it). I benefitted from discussions on this point with Dan Coquillette, Jamres Gordley,
and Jim Rogers.
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field modernized English commercial law by scrutinizing businesses in
order to identify and enforce the best commercial practices. Simi-
larly, when Professor Llewellyn directed the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code, he identified the best commercial practices of the
day and wrote them into the Code. 2 In these examples, state law
builds upon pre-existing social norms; hence the phrase, "law from
order."3
Some scholars believe that bottom-up law, like the human appen-
dix, is a vestigial organ that modernization will remove.4 I believe, to
the contrary, that the urgency of bottom-up law increases with eco-
nomic and social complexity. As society diversifies and businesses spe-
cialize, state officials struggle to keep informed about the changing
practices of people, and people struggle to make lawmakers respond
to changing practices. To loosen these constraints on information
and motivation, law must decentralize. Decentralized law requires
guidance from a theory of social norms, which is the subject of this
Article.
Most social and business practices would not benefit from state
enforcement, because of the latter's rigidity and high transaction
costs. Consequently, the state should not enforce many moral obliga-
tions, such as the promise to be home on time for dinner. For other
norms, however, such as the promise to deliver coal to a steel mill,
state enforcement increases the ability of parties to cooperate. The
state should raise such norms to the level of law and enforce them. In
an environment of open competition, business practices tend to
evolve rapidly towards efficiency, which benefits the nation. Without
open competition, however, harmful business norms can create mo-
nopoly power or distort consumer information; these incomplete mar-
kets can impose external costs. The state should suppress harmful
norms, such as the collusive and monopolistic practices of cartels, and
fill gaps in norms with laws, as when pollution outruns responsibility.
The state's decision to ignore, strengthen, or undermine social
norms needs guidance from a theory with comprehensive vision. A
comprehensive theory of social norms draws upon various develop-
ments in the humanities, social sciences, and law. This Article focuses
2 See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt
to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEo. L.J. 1141, 1151-60
(1985).
3 See Robert D. Cooter, Law From Order, in A NoT-So-DIsMAL SCIENCE: A BROADER,
BRIGHTER APPROACH TO ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES (J. Mancur Olson & S. Kahkonen eds.,
forthcoming 1998).
4 For example, John Salmond concluded that customarylaw is important in the early
stages of legal development, but gradually cedes its place to statutes when "the state has
grown to its full strength." GLANvTLLE WILLIAMS, SALMOND ONJURISPRUDENCE 234 (11th ed.
1957).
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upon aspects of a comprehensive theory of social norms suitable for
economic analysis.
Just as regulations ideally correct failures in markets, laws ideally
correct failures in social norms. No law is required when the "market"
for social norms works, but when it fails, law may improve the situa-
tion by enforcing a beneficial social norm, suppressing a harmful so-
cial norm, or supplying a missing obligation. The theory of normative
failures is a diagnostic tool for explaining if, when, and how the state
should intervene by imposing law.
This Article is divided into'four main parts. After discussing pre-
cursors in Part I, Part II defines "social norm" and operationalizes the
definition by connecting it to economic analysis. Part III develops a
model of morality. Finally, Part IV applies models of morality to law,
showing how different forms of normative failure require different
kinds of corrective laws.
Unlike philosophical or theological theories, models organize
morality according to the causes of its persistence. Individuals com-
mitted to one moral norm often compete with uncommitted individu-
als and with individuals committed to another norm. Models of
morality explain how a commitment can persist in competition with
noncommitment and with other commitments. I will characterize
some moral obligations that compete successfully and persist. In an
evolutionary equilibrium, all strategies that persist enjoy equal payoffs.
An analysis of equilibria identifies normative failures and diagnoses
them. This diagnosis provides a guide to their correction. Thus,
models of morality are diagnostic tools of normative failure that can
guide state lawmaking.
I
PRECURSORS
This Article has various intellectual precursors. Philosophers
have labored over the questions, "What is law?", and, "What are the
conditions under which a law exists?"5 Legal scholars, however, un-
derestimated the importance of social norms until empirical research
proved that inchoate social norms often control behavior in spite of
the law. To illustrate, American businesses frequently remain ration-
ally ignorant of the legal consequences of the contracts that they
sign,6 small businesses in Taiwan often borrow outside the scope of
5 See, e.g., H.L_A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1-17 (2d ed. 1994) (exploring the
foundations of a legal system); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 121-205 (2d
ed. 1980) (discussing elements of legal systems).
6 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business. A Preliminay Study, 28
Am. Soc. REv. 55, 58-61 (1963).
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formal legal regulation,7 and many Peruvian businesses systematically
break the law to circumvent excessive regulations. 8
The formal analysis of social norms is developed by applying
game theory.9 The economic analysis of social norms draws upon a
fundamental result in game theory: one-shot games with inefficient
solutions (e.g., Prisoners' Dilemma) often have efficient solutions
when repeated between the same players.10 This generalization
grounds the "utilitarianism of small groups," by which I mean the ten-
dency of small groups to develop efficient rules for cooperation
among members.
The utilitarianism of small groups has been demonstrated for cat-
tie ranchers,11 Chinese traders, 12 medieval merchants,13 and modem
merchant associations. 14 Research on property rights has revealed va-
riety and detail in the political arrangements by which small groups
manage their assets.15 Utilitarianism applies to social groups whose
7 See Jane Kaufman Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal
Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 L. & Soc'Y REv. 193, 211-25 (1994).
8 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
WORLD 59-92 (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row 1989).
9 See, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987) (developing a
theory of collective action with game theory); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALUT, THE EMERGENCE
OF NORMS (1977) (providing a rational reconstruction of the formal features of states of
social interaction in which norms emerge); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Econom-
ics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1982) (using game
theory to categorize different ways in which cooperation might fail); Robert Sugden, Red-
procity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772 (1984)
(proposing an economic analysis of nonselfish behavior).
10 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-24 (1984); Drew
Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incom-
plete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533, 533-36 (1986).
11 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
52-64 (1991).
12 SeeJanet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Insti-
tutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981);Janet T. Landa, The Polit-
ical Economy of the Ethnically Homogeneous Chinese Middleman Group in Southeast Asia: Ethnicity
and Entrepreneurship in a Plural Society, in THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 86 (Linda Y.C.
Lim & L.A. Peter Gosling eds., 1983).
13 See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,
2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
14 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, The Newest Law
Merchant: Private Commercial Law in the United States (Feb. 7, 1995) (unpublished man-
uscript on file with the Northwestern University Law School Library).
15 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTrrU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Thrdinn Eggertsson, Analyzing Institutional Successes
and Failures: A Millennium of Common Mountain Pastures in Iceland, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
423 (1992) (focusing on the structure and consequences of property rights in communal
mountain pastures); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE Lj. 1315, 1335-41
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members repeatedly interact with each other, such as the Berkeley
Chess Club, but not to social categories of people who seldom inter-
act, such as chess players in California. 16 Furthermore, one group
may develop norms that benefit its members by subordinating people
from other groups.17
My analysis of social norms combines competing theories of ex-
ternalities. Pigou viewed externalities as a market failure that law
should correct.' 8 Samuelson's distinction between public and private
goods increased the mathematical precision of Pigou's approach.19
This tradition has a clear prescription: markets for private goods, gov-
ernment for public goods, taxes for externalities. Coase challenged
this tradition by arguing that externalities can be cured in the market,
provided that transaction costs do not obstruct private bargains. 20
This Article retains Coase's view that markets cure many externalities,
but rejects his view that bargaining provides the mechanism. Instead,
this Article proposes a mechanism with better empirical support-so-
cial norms.
In the 1970s, economists drawing upon the analysis of externali-
ties and public goods reached a remarkable consensus concerning the
intellectual framework for analyzing and justifying state regulation of
the economy. According to this framework, a prima facie case for
public intervention requires a demonstration of the failure of a free
market.2' A failure exists when a free market departs so far from per-
fect competition as to impair its performance. Tests for market fail-
(1993) (discussing the establishment of land regimes for three separate pioneer settle-
ments); Donald N. McCloskey, The Economics of Enclosure: A Market Analysis, in EUROPEAN
PEASANTS AND THEIR MARKETS 123 (William N. Parker & Eric L.Jones eds., 1975) (detailing
the enclosure movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Donald N. McClos-
key, The Persistence of English Common Fields, in EUROPEAN PEASANTS AND THEIR MARKETS,
supra, at 73 [hereinafter McCloskey, Persistence] (examining the change in efficiency of
English agriculture attributable to the enclosure of open fields).
16 See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanc-
tions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 137-44 (1996).
17 See George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One
Consequence, 94 Q.J. ECON. 749, 749-53 (1980); George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-
Based Wages Among Tradition-Oriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 265, 265-66 (1985); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1013-17 (1995).
18 A.C. Pirou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 329-35 (4th ed. 1960).
19 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory ofPublic Expenditure 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387
(1954); see also WilliamJ. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON.
REv. 307 (1972) (asserting that the conclusions of the Pigouvian traditions are impecca-
ble); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure 37 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955) (presenting a mathematical exposition of public expenditure
theory).
20 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
21 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982) (asserting that
the justification for regulatory intervention arises out of the market's inability to deal with
particular structural problems); CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTER-
1997]
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ure are developed through general equilibrium theory. 2 2 A
conclusive case for regulation requires a further demonstration that a
proposed remedy would succeed politically, and would not be sub-
verted by government bureaucracy or interest groups. Tests for polit-
ical failure are developed through regulation and collective choice
theory.23 Economists of different political persuasions usually agree
about this general framework, even though they disagree about the
conclusions its application yields.
Economics struggles to comprehend normative commitment.
The theory of cooperative games, which requires players to have nor-
mative commitments, languished while the theory of noncooperative
games flourished. To illustrate, the classic textbook on game theory
devotes a chapter to cooperative games,24 whereas one of the best
modern books on the subject omits it.25 By omitting the theory of
cooperative games, the authors favor purity over reality. In reality,
players who "irrationally" commit to particular norms often do better
historically and in experimental games than those who do not.26
Microeconomics typically treats morality as an "exogenous taste," with-
out explaining commitment. 27
Promising new developments in analyzing morality come from ev-
olutionary economics. 28 In evolutionary models, normative commit-
ment flourishes to the extent that a competitive environment rewards
it. Moral commitment imposes self-restraint that sometimes conveys
an advantage in competition with others.29 The emotions provide a
biological basis for commitment.3 0 A prominent philosopher claims
that rationality also provides a basis for commitment. According to
David Gauthier, the fact that a person gains an advantage by making a
ErSr 35-46 (1977) (concluding that regulation may be the best alternative when there are
market failures).
22 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARRow & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALysIs (1971).
23 See GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975); Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theoy of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). For a review of the volumi-
nous public-choice literature, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (rev. ed., 1989).
24 R. DUNCAN LUCE & HowARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 114-54 (1957).
25 DREw FUDENBERG &JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991).
26 See AXELROD, supra note 10, at 173.
27 See, e.g., Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745, 764-71 (1994); Timur Kuran, Islamic Economics and
the Islamic Subeconomy, J. ECON. PERsp., Fall 1995, at 155, 167-69; Milgrom et al., supra note
13, at 6-14.
28 See, e.g., Abhijit Banerjee &J6rgen W. Weibull, Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent
Game Theoretic Results, in 2 ECONOMICS IN A CHANGING WORLD: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 90 (Beth Allen ed.,
1996).
29 See Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function,
Would He Want One with a Conscience., 77 AM. ECON. REv. 593, 594-602 (1987).
30 See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMO-
TIONS 5-7 (1988).
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commitment provides a reason for carrying through later, even
though, the person can subsequently gain an advantage by not follow-
ing through.31 In experimental economics, the initial discovery of the
resilience of moral commitment has yielded to progressive refine-
ments that explain what people are committed to.32 Social psycholo-
gists have accumulated impressive evidence that most people conform
to laws based on moral rules to which they are committed. According
to Tyler, moral commitment to particular rules proves more impor-
tant for most people's obedience to law than general respect for law
or fear of punishment.33
Proponents of decentralization have long admired social norms
because they arise spontaneously, outside the state.34 Economic analy-
sis reveals a surprising level of efficiency in common law rules, which
theorists have struggled to explain.35 A recent explanation assumes
that judges enforce social norms, and social norms evolve towards
efficiency.3 6
I have briefly reviewed analytical research by social scientists that
has revived interest among legal scholars in social norms. To illustrate
this renewed interest among lawyers, the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review recently devoted an entire issue to the subject of social
norms.
37
II
PREFACE TO A MODEL
In this Article, I generalize and extend some of my previous work
on social norms.38 To develop a model of morality, I must define
terms and operationalize the definitions.
31 DAVID GAUTHIER, MoRAts BY AGREEMENT 165-89 (1986).
32 See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining
Games, in 7 GAMEs & ECON. BEHAV. 346 (1994).
33 TOM R. TYLER, WHs' PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 44-45 (1990).
34 See, e.g., ELLCKSON, supra note 11, at 4-6; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERF-
DOM 72-87 (1944); BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 146-52 (expanded 3d ed. 1991);
Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 COR.NELL INT'L L.J.
1, 7-13 (1994).
35 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without
the Help ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process
and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the
Common Law Efficient, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
36 See Robert Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of De-
centralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994).
37 Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996).
38 Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996) [hereinafter Cooter,
Decentralized Law]; RobertD. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 141 (1996).
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A. Definitions
Obligation differs from inclination. To illustrate, men take off
their hats in church from obligation, but they take off their hats in a
boiler room from inclination.3 9 Many economists apparently believe
that a behavioral theory can dispense with the distinction between ob-
ligations and inclinations.40 This view is mistaken. Obligations affect
behavior in distinctively different ways from inclinations.41 Later I
consider these distinctive effects in detail.
Different types of norms correspond to different meanings of
"norm." Philosophers usually use "norm" to refer to what people
ought to do.42 According to this usage, the obligation to remove
one's hat in church implies the existence of a norm, whereas the incli-
nation to remove one's hat in a boiler room implies the existence of a
regularity. Unlike philosophers, social scientists sometimes use
"norm" to mean average behavior. For example, statisticians talk
about the "normal distribution," and sociologists sometimes use
"norm" to mean what people normally do, as opposed to what devi-
ants do. These statistical and sociological uses identify norms with
regularities, which may differ from inclinations or obligations.
I believe that decentralizing law requires internalizing obliga-
tions. Internalization especially occurs through socialization, which
teaches young people the conventional virtues at the core of morality.
In this Article, I focus upon consensus obligations in the core of con-
ventional morality, not moral controversy or critical morality.
An analysis of consensus obligations must distinguish between
what people say and what they do. Everyone may say that people
ought to do something that they do not do. For example, used car
dealers may protest their truthfulness to customers and then tell lies
when the truth proves inconvenient. More often, however, words af-
fect deeds. To illustrate, most men say that they ought to take their
hats off in church, and this fact partly explains why they do it. Obliga-
tions that influence behavior are most important to decentralizing
law. Consequently, this Article focuses upon the class of social norms
consisting in effective consensus obligations (ECOs).
39 Women used to put their hats on in church, and men still put their hats on in
synagogue. The particular content of the obligation is unimportant to my argument.
40 This view developed forcefully in the "ordinalist revolution" of the 1930s, which
established a form of positivism as the dominant philosophy of economics. For a discus-
sion with references, see Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong
About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LiTERATURE 507 (1984).
41 SeeAmartya K. Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 ECONOMETRICA 745 (1997);
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6
PHIL. & PUB. Aiw. 317 (1977) [hereinafter Sen, Rational Fools].
42 See, e.g., GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, NoRM AND ACION 1-16 (1963).
954 [Vol. 82:947
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Notice that a close connection exists between an ECO and a "law"
in the positive theory of law. In its early form in English jurispru-
dence, the positive theory asserted that law is the command of a sover-
eign, where a sovereign is someone whom others obey and who does
not obey anyone. 43 Generalizing, the "sovereign" becomes the pro-
cess for making laws stipulated in higher level laws. A law created by
following the correct procedures has the right "pedigree."44 In the
modem formulation, a law regulating behavior is an effective obliga-
tion with the right pedigree. 45 Similarly, I focus upon effective obliga-
tions that a community creates by consensus.
Agreement produces a true consensus, whereas coercion pro-
duces a false consensus. To produce a true consensus, obligations re-
quire justification. The necessity ofjustification restricts the behaviors
that can become socially obligatory. To illustrate, accepted standards
of morality cannot justify the proposition, "Everyone but me should
tell the truth." Later, I discuss how economists can analyze the justifi-
cation of social obligation. For now, I note that by eliminating strate-
gies that cannot sustain social obligation, we can alleviate the problem
of too many equilibria that plagues game theory.46
B. Operations
To construct an economic model, I need to operationalize the
definition of an ECO. Economists model the transmission of informa-
tion by using signaling theory. A consensus, which exists when every-
one agrees, resembles a uniform signal, by which I mean a situation in
which everyone transmits an identical signal. Therefore, I identify the
existence of a consensus obligation with a uniform signaling equilib-
rium. To illustrate, people agree that they ought to tell the truth; this
belief influences their behavior, even though they sometimes lie.
Now I turn to the effectiveness of a social obligation. People
sometimes say that they will do one thing, and ultimately do another.
An effective norm changes behavior by increasing the level of obedi-
ence through two distinct means-self-restraint and punishment. The
extent of self-restraint and informal punishment depends upon the
extent to which people internalize the obligation. I will now analyze
the elusive concept of internalization.
43 SeeJOHN.AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DERMINED 136-37 (Legal Clas-
sics Library 1984) (1832).
44 See RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I & II, in TAKING RIGHrrs SERIOUSLY 14, 17
(1977).
45 See HART, supra note 5, at 97-107; RAz, supra note 5, at 147-56.
46 The Folk Theorem formulates the problem of multiple equilibria. See Fudenberg
& Maskin, supra note 10, at 537.
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Internalization resembles the game-theory concept of commit-
ment.47 Commitment is an action a player takes to change his payoffs,
such as a commander burning the bridges behind his army to commit
them to advancing, or an alcoholic drafting a check to mail to the
political party that he hates if he resumes drinking. By raising the
costs of the disfavored action, commitments typically reduce freedom.
Similarly, by narrowing the set of permitted actions, moral commit-
ment reduces the actor's freedom.
Psychologists often study the internalization of obligations. 48
One approach conceives of internalization as attaching guilt to forbid-
den actions, thus raising their psychological cost.49 Similarly, econo-
mists and utilitarians can understand internalization as raising the
subjective cost of violating an obligation.
A loftier conception of internalization, based not on guilt but on
reason, is found in Kant's philosophy5 ° and Kohlberg's psychology. 5'
I use the term "loftier" because these theories suppose that people can
act from respect for the law, not merely to avoid guilt or unpleasant-
ness.52 This approach rejects the model of desire, according to which
a desire explains every act,55 and endorses the model of reason, ac-
cording to which the perception of rightness can motivate behavior.54
Anti-utilitarians can understand internalization as self-imposed con-
straint upon action.
An intermediate position between utilitarianism and anti-utilitari-
anism conceives of the committed actor as utility maximizing subject
to side constraints. 55 The side constraints for moral actors come from
internalized obligations, as do external limits that technology and
wealth impose. For purposes of my analysis, the precise mechanism of
commitment-whether guilt or respect-need not concern us, so
47 See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 41, at 326-29.
48 See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 18-29 (James Strachey ed. & Joan
Riviere trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1960) (1923); JEAN PAGEr, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF
THE CHID (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1932); MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL
NORMS 13-108 (1936); Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theo-
retical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, in 24 ADVANCEs IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 201 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991); Lawrence Kohlberg,
Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF So-
CIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347, 409-14 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969).
49 See supra note 48.
50 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 430-35 (Norman Kemp Smith trans.,
unabr. ed., St. Martin's Press 1929) (1781).
51 Kohlberg, supra note 48, at 409-14.
52 KANT, supra note 50, at 643-44; Kohlberg, supra note 48, at 413.
53 See Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice Theory and Folk Psychology
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
54 See THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILIrY OF ALTRUISM 79-89 (1970).
55 See ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-30 (1974).
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long as one accepts the proposition that internalization changes
behavior.
After an obligation is internalized, it can conflict with an inclina-
tion. Suppressing an inclination and performing an obligation re-
quires strength of will. Since Aristotle, moral philosophers have
analyzed the problem of weakness of will (technically known as akra-
sia).56 Economists usually adopt a model of decisiorimaking that pre-
cludes internal conflict, but some economists have analyzed the
problem under the rubric of "self-monitoring" or the "divided self."'57
At least one paper applies such a model to crimes and torts.58
Internalizing a norm has two important effects upon behavior,
which I call self-restraint and righteousness. By self-restraint, I mean
the willingness of a person to conform to an obligation that conflicts
with an inclination. By righteousness, I mean the willingness of some-
one who internalizes an obligation to punish other people for violat-
ing it.
Later, I show that self-restraint and righteousness affect society in
fundamentally different ways. Righteousness motivates punishment,
and punishing violators changes the aggregate level of conformity to a
norm. I call the resulting change a "punishment-induced equilib-
rium." In contrast, self-restraint changes who conforms to a social
norm without changing aggregate conformity. For now, I postpone
explaining why self-restraint affects individuals and not groups.
Figure 1 summarizes how I operationalize ECOs. I identify inter-
nalization with commitrnent, consensus with a uniform signal, and ef-
fectiveness with a punishment-induced equilibrium.
Figure 1: "Social Norms" Defined and Operationalized
Define Operationalize
obligation commitment
consensus uniform signal
effective punishment-induced equilibrium
56 See S.L. HuRLEY, NATURAL PERSONS: PERSONALrY AND POLrIY 4 (1989).
57 See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57-112 (1984); Richard
H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theoy of SelfCContro4 89J. POL. ECON. 392 (1981); see
also THE MULTIPLE SELF (Jon Elster ed., 1985) (collected essays) (discussing "the multiple
self").
58 See Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Cimes: Towards an
Economic Theoy of the Wil 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 149 (1991).
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III
A MODEL OF MORALT=
Having operationalized terms, I will now outline a general model
of morality.
A. The Possibility of Commitment
Commitment to a moral rule constrains an actor's choices, and in
many circumstances, fewer choices imply worse outcomes. If so, how
can committed actors succeed in competition with uncommitted ac-
tors? This question also implicates the ability of morality to persist in
a competitive world.
The unconstrained actor's apparent advantage comes from focus-
ing on problems of distribution. In pure distribution games, which
are also called zero-sum games or games of pure conflict, the parties
have no basis for cooperating with each other.5 9 Instead of cooperat-
ing, each tries to beat the other. A game of pure distribution is like a
fight, and moral commitment is like fighting with one arm tied be-
hind your back. To appreciate the advantages of commitment, focus
upon cooperation rather than conflict. In games of production, un-
like in zero-sum games, the parties can create joint value. Coopera-
tion facilitates production, and commitment facilitates cooperation.
Therefore, in games of production a committed actor often gains an
advantage by increasing the level of cooperation.
To illustrate, Max Weber believed that the Quakers' commitment
to sell at the 'Just price" instead of haggling to get a higher price, gave
them a distinct advantage in marketing industrial goods.60 In modern
language, the moral commitment of the Quakers facilitated mass mar-
keting by reducing transaction costs and overcoming asymmetrical
information.
Another illustration comes from the "agency game," which is cen-
tral to modem theories of contracts. 61 Assume that the principal must
decide whether to place assets under the agent's control. If the agent
receives control, he can appropriate the assets, which redistributes the
value of the assets from principal to the agent. Alternatively, the
agent can cooperate, producing a surplus that can be divided between
the parties.
59 See FUDENBERG & TIRoLE, supra note 25, at 4; JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGEN-
STERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 47 (1944).
60 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAuSM 144-54 (Talcott
Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1904).
61 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 161-202 (2d ed. 1997);
see also Cooter, supra note 3 (using the "agency game" as a basis for the development of
contract theory).
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In this illustration, appropriation yields higher immediate profits
for the agent than cooperation. Appropriation, however, yields a
long-run disadvantage relative to cooperation. Principals usually re-
tain agents who cooperate, whereas principals dismiss agents who get
caught appropriating. Consequently, appropriating agents form un-
stable relationships and repeatedly have to search for new partners-a
process that consumes time and resources. Cooperating agents, in
contrast, form stable relationships and seldom have to search for new
partners. Thus, cooperators frequently enjoy a modest payoff while
appropriators only occasionally enjoy a high payoff.
B. Evolutionary Equilibrium
In this section I will characterize an equilibrium that exists when
only some people commit to moral rules. Think of commitment and
noncommitment to morality as alternative strategies in a game.
Which of these strategies will survive in competition with the other?
Competition tends to eliminate below-average strategies, and propels
the game toward a situation in which every surviving strategy earns the
same payoff. By an internal evolutionary equilibrium, I mean a situation
in which some players commit to morality and others do not, with
both kinds of players earning the same payoff.
To illustrate, in the agency game, agents who commit to morality
cooperate, whereas agents who do not commit either appropriate or
cooperate, depending upon which activity earns a higher payoff. I
previously explained that cooperators form stable relationships, sel-
dom search for new partners, and thus frequently earn a modest pay-
off. Appropriators, however, form unstable relationships, often search
for new partners, and thus only occasionally earn a high payoff. An
internal equilibrium is a situation in which both kinds of agents exist,
with each earning the same average payoff.
It is not hard to see why an internal equilibrium may exist. As the
number of appropriators increases, more of them search for partners
at each point in time. As more agents search, finding partners be-
comes more difficult. Cooperators form enduring relationships, so
the difficulty in finding a new partner affects them less. In contrast,
appropriators form temporary relationships, so the difficulty in find-
ing a new partner affects them more. This fact can induce a stable
equilibrium at a point where some agents cooperate and others
appropriate. 62
62 In the agency game, a stable internal equilibrium usually exists when an increase in
the proportion of appropriators causes the expected payoff from appropriation to de-
crease. Equivalently, a stable internal equilibrium usually exists in commodity markets
when an increase in the quantity of production causes the cost of production to increase.
See Cooter, supra note 3.
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To illustrate equilibration, start from a situation with too many
appropriators, so that the payoff from cooperating exceeds the payoff
from appropriating. In these circumstances, uncommitted agents will
switch from appropriating to cooperating, until the payoff from coop-
erating falls to the same level as the payoff from appropriating.
Alternatively, start from a situation with too many cooperators, so
that the payoff from appropriating exceeds the payoff from cooperat-
ing. In these circumstances, uncommitted agents will switch from co-
operating to appropriating, until the payoff from appropriating falls
to the same level as the payoff from cooperating.
Notice that in these examples, the uncommitted actors create the
equilibrium by changing their behavior. The actors who make the
equilibrium are thus "marginal" in the economic sense. In contrast,
the committed actors are not "marginal," and do not create the
equilibrium.
To illustrate an interesting application, Brennan and Hamlin ob-
serve that personal markets with repeat transactions reward virtue,
whereas impersonal markets with one-shot transactions do not reward
virtue.63 From this observation they postulate that economic develop-
ment, which increases the scope of competitive markets, reduces vir-
tue by rewarding it less. 64 They call this process "economizing on
virtue."65
C. Ineffectiveness of Self-Restraint
In the preceding account of equilibration, the "marginal" actors
who make the equilibrium are uncommitted. This fact has an impor-
tant consequence for commitment. Commitment leads to self-re-
straint, but self-restraint does not change the equilibrium. Only
marginal actors can change the equilibrium.
To understand the ineffectiveness of self-restraint in competition,
consider truth-telling among sellers. In an internal equilibrium, some
businesses obey the norm of truth-telling and others violate it. Truth-
ful sellers enjoy repeat purchases from the same customers, whereas
dishonest sellers must continually search for new customers. In com-
petitive equilibrium, the profit rate for truth-telling is the same as for
lying. Given equal payoffs, some sellers who do not commit to truth-
telling will tell the truth solely to maximize their payoffs. I use the
term "adventitious" to mean conforming to a norm without commit-
ting to it. Adventitious truth-tellers are the marginal sellers who, by
changing their behavior, create the equilibrium.
63 Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Economizing on Virtue, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 35,
43-44 (1995).
64 Id. at 42-46.
65 Id.
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I will now illustrate the ineffectiveness of self-restraint. Beginning
from an equilibrium, assume that one of the liars "gets religion," inter-
nalizes the norm, and switches to truth-telling. The increase in the
number of truth-tellers lowers their rate of return relative to liars, and
places the system in disequilibrium. To restore equilibrium, one of
the adventitious truth-tellers switches strategies and starts lying. This
switch restores equality to the profit rates for the two strategies. The
new equilibrium, however, contains the same proportion of truth-tell-
ers and liars as before. Thus, although one dishonest seller "gets reli-
gion," this does not change the aggregate level of truth-telling.
I will now clarify this point using a numerical example of the
agency game. Assume that sixty agents commit to cooperating,
whereas the remaining forty cooperate adventitiously or appropriate,
depending upon which behavior earns a higher payoff. Assume that
the payoff for cooperating equals the payoff for appropriating when
eighty agents cooperate and twenty agents appropriate. Thus, an
equilibrium is reached when sixty agents cooperate from commit-
ment, twenty agents cooperate adventitiously, and twenty agents
appropriate.
Now, assume that one of the appropriators "gets religion," inter-
nalizes the norm, and starts cooperating. The system is now in dise-
quilibrium, with eighty-one cooperators and nineteen appropriators.
Equilibrium is restored when one of the adventitious cooperators
changes strategy and starts appropriating. In the new equilibrium, the
aggregate levels of coopertion and appropriation remain eighty and
twenty, respectively. Only the identity of one cooperator and one ap-
propriator has changed.
These illustrations demonstrate that the marginal actors in an ev-
olutionary equilibrium are adventitious conformists, as a result of
which, self-restraint in competition does not change the equilibrium
proportion of people conforming to a norm.66 Self-restraint might
prove effective in a different kind of model. To illustrate, commit-
ments that earn below average payoffs can persist because of competi-
tive slack. If morality pays less than amorality, then no one conforms
adventitiously and committed actors are marginal. Developing this
line of argument requires a disequilibrium analysis. Instead, I turn
from self-restraint to punishment, and consider the latter's effects on
equilibria.
66 I have developed this argument more rigorously elsewhere. See Cooter, Decentralized
Law, supra note 38, at 1657-77; Cooter, supra note 3.
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D. Effectiveness of Punishment
Internalization typically results in a willingness to punish others,
often motivated by a sense of righteousness. Righteousness can suc-
ceed in changing aggregate behavior where self-restraint fails. A per-
son who internalizes a norm may punish people who violate it, even at
a cost to himself. The prospect of punishment-informal or formal-
raises the expected cost of an action, which reduces its frequency.
Thus, the willingness of people who internalize a norm to punish vio-
lators changes the aggregate level of conformity to it.
To illustrate, consider the preceding example of an industry with
some truth-tellers and some liars. A buyer victimized by lies will refuse
to deal with that seller in the future. In addition, the victim may
broadcast this information to discourage other people from dealing
with the liar. The resulting boycott decreases the dishonest seller's
profits. Starting from an equilibrium, this fall in profits creates a dise-
quilibrium. Restoring the equilibrium requires a decrease in the
number of sellers who lie. Thus, punishment changes the equilibrium
proportion of truth-tellers and liars.
For a numerical example, return to the agency game in which an
equilibrium exists when sixty agents cooperate from commitment,
twenty agents cooperate adventitiously, and twenty agents appropri-
ate. This equilibrium previously assumed that principals punish ap-
propriating agents by terminating the relationship, and that principals
do not use reputational punishment. However, this example will show
how reputational punishment changes the equilibrium.
Assume that someone who internalizes the norm of cooperation
feels righteous anger toward appropriating agents. When victimized,
this person blackens wrongdoers' reputations by warning other peo-
ple against them. This reputational punishment lengthens the ex-
pected time that appropriating agents spend searching for
uninformed principals, thus causing a fall in the expected payoff from
appropriation. To restore equilibrium, the number of appropriating
agents must fall relative to the number of cooperating agents. Equi-
librium is restored when some appropriators switch to adventitious co-
operation. The new equilibrium consists of, say, eighty-five
cooperators and fifteen appropriators.
Internalizing a norm makes the victim of a wrong more willing to
devote resources to broadcasting information about the wrongdoer.
Devoting resources to punishing violators increases the equilibrium
level of cooperation. In general, as more people internalize a social
norm, the expected punishment from violating it increases, thus caus-
ing a decrease in the equilibrium number of violators.
From a technical standpoint, punishing wrongdoers resembles re-
warding rightdoers. In either case, increasing punishment or reward
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creates a gap in the payoffs of wrongdoers and rightdoers. Although
they are not identical, punishments, as well as rewards, can change the
equilibrium level of conformity to a norm.67 This analysis could dis-
cuss reward-induced equilibria, but I will not pursue this detail.
E. Fundamental Instability of Informal Punishment
Informal punishments usually involve rebuking someone, refus-
ing to deal with them, or blackening their reputation. A person who
punishes someone in these ways often risks confrontation or revenge.
This risk tends to decline as more people join in punishing the wrong-
doers. Consequently, the enforcer's cost of punishing decreases as
the proportion of enforcers increases.
Interdependent costs in economic models typically create insta-
bilities and multiple equilibria.68 For example, if people believe that
others will support them, then, as in California, many are willing to
rebuke those who smoke in public buildings. Conversely, if people
believe that few will support them, then, as in Europe, no one may be
willing to rebuke those who smoke in public buildings.
These facts can result in two equilibria, one at a high level of
enforcement and one at a low level of enforcement. In between the
two equilibria lies a "tipping point." If the system begins at a level of
enforcement above the tipping point, it "tips in" to a high level of
norm enforcement. Conversely, if the system begins at a level of en-
forcement below the tipping point, it "tips out" to a low level of norm
enforcement.
With multiple equilibria, the place where the system comes to rest
depends upon where it started-whether above or below the tipping
point. This phenomenon is sometimes called "path dependence,"69
because the equilibrium depends upon the path traveled to reach it.
Path dependence is the way economic theory accommodates history.
As the number of people willing to punish increases, the cost of
informally punishing wrongdoers decreases rapidly, causing instabil-
ity.70 To see why, consider that people may be ranked from "high" to
67 For example, if the number of rightdoers exceeds the number of wrongdoers, then
more rewards must be paid than punishments extracted in order to reach the same
number of people (extensive margin). Rightdoers may respond to rewards differently than
wrongdoers respond to punishment (intensive margin). Rightdoing may be easier to ob-
serve than wrongdoing (information costs).
68 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 IIr'L REv. L.
& ECON. 31, 37-38 (1992).
69 Models of law with multiple equilibria and path dependence are found in Hirsh-
leifer, supra note 9.
70 These facts can be analyzed using a curve to depict people's willingness to pay to
punish wrongdoers (a demand curve), and a curve indicating the expected cost of punish-
ing wrongdoers (a supply curve). See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 38, at 1669-75;
Robert D. Cooter, The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the
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"low" according to how much they are willing to pay to punish wrong-
doers. Recall that a person who punishes risks confrontation or re-
venge, both of which become less likely as more people participate in
punishing. Consequently, the expected cost a person faces for infor-
mally punishing falls as more people participate.
If, as the number of enforcers increases, the expected cost falls
faster than willingness to pay, then the system cascades toward increas-
ing levels of enforcement. Conversely, if, as the number of enforcers
decreases, the expected cost rises faster than willingness to pay, then
the system cascades toward decreasing levels of enforcement.
Later, I will explore some additional consequences of multiple
equilibria and instability in social norms.
F. Consensus
So far, I have assumed the existence of a consensus about what
people ought to do, but now I will consider how a consensus forms.
1. Uniform Signaling
Some people commit to particular moral rules and others do not.
In many circumstances, people prefer to deal with another person
who commits to morality rather than with someone who remains un-
committed. To illustrate, in most circumstances, people prefer that
others tell the truth, cooperate, keep promises, play fair, help the
community, and so forth.
Most people would hesitate to deal with someone who denies that
people have these obligations. In these circumstances, even liars and
appropriators condemn lying and appropriating. In general, people
increase their opportunities for dealing with others by representing
themselves as committed to morality. Thus, most people say that eve-
ryone ought to be truthful, cooperative, reliable, and so forth. Most
people's willingness to say these things constitutes a consensus about
conventional morality.
The so-called "human virtues" provide an example of how moral-
ity promotes cooperation. Since Aquinas, Catholic doctrine distin-
gnished seven cardinal virtues-three theological virtues (faith, hope,
and love) and four human virtues (justice, prudence, temperance,
and courage).71 The three theological virtues are viewed as gifts from
Legal Foundations of Development, in ANNuAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 1996 191, 197-201 (1997).
71 The distinction of cardinal virtues into human and theological, and a discussion of
each, occurs in questions 61 and 62 of the Summa Theologica. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pr. 1-11, Qs. 61-62, at 846-53 (Fathers of the English Dominican Prov-
ince trans., Christian Classics 1981). I am grateful to James Gordley for a discussion of
these points.
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God, whereas the four human virtues are viewed as habits acquired by
acting right.7 2 A person without admiration for the human virtues
lacks the motivation necessary to acquire them.73
In many circumstances, people prefer to deal with others who
have the human virtues. Because admiring the human virtues is a nec-
essary step toward acquiring them, people declare their admiration
for the human virtues to signal that they have acquired them or are
trying to do so. A model of the virtues would explain in detail why
people want to signal that they have them, as well as why people who
have them succeed in competition with others.
In general, a consensus forms about conventional morality when
a uniform signal is best for each individual. Uniform signaling, how-
ever, involves a paradox. If everyone transmits the same signal, the
signal does not convey any information about differences among peo-
ple. To illustrate, if every agent proclaims that all agents should coop-
erate and not appropriate, then the agents' proclamations do not
distinguish cooperators from appropriators. Nevertheless, an agent
will lose business if he departs from this convention by proclaiming
that agents have no obligation of loyalty to principals.
I have explained why everyone needs to signal their own commit-
ment to morality by proclaiming their admiration for it. Economists
have developed "rat race" models to explain how people lock them-
selves into a competition to out-do each other.74 Moral consensus is a
kind of beneficial rat race. Like a rat race, people compete with each
other to proclaim their admiration for, and commitment to, morality.
The result, however, is beneficial, because the consensus causes some
people to internalize morality, which shifts the evolutionary equilib-
rium toward more cooperation and production.
Moral philosophy often asks such questions as, "Why should I
favor the rule that everyone should tell the truth, rather than the rule
that everyone but me should tell the truth?" The theory of uniform
signaling explains why one should represent oneself as favoring the
rule that everyone should tell the truth. Uniform signaling theory
thus provides another perspective on Kantian "universalizability."
When economists depict the interaction of people as a point in a
multidimensional strategy space, an equilibrium can occur at a "cor-
ner" or in the "interior" of the space. A player arrives at a corner
because he chooses an extreme value of the variable that he controls,
much like a race-car driver who floors the gas pedal. A uniform signal
in a population represents a corner equilibrium. Thus, the first row
72 See id. at 851, 854-57.
73 See id. at 854-62.
74 See, e.g., A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIR-
ING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES 76-87 (1974).
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in Figure 2 depicts a uniform signal as a corner equilibrium, with hon-
esty as an example.
Figure 2: Signaling Equilibria
nalequilibrium example
uniform comer honesty
complementary interior responsibilities
contradictory none equality
A good scientific theory runs the risk of disconfirmation by facts.
As the equilibria in a game increase, the model's risk of
disconfirmation decreases. Many games have too many equilibria for
the models to be good science. 75 However, the consensus
requirement dramatically reduces the number of equilibria. In
technical terms, many strategies are Nash equilibria,76 which cannot
sustain social norms because they fail to produce uniform signals.
Thus, the consensus requirement increases the scientific value of
models of morality.
2. Complementary
Most people prefer a meal that is not all vegetables, and a concert
that is not all trumpets. Similarly, a modern economy requires many
different competencies. Weber and Durkheim stressed that comple-
mentary specialization requires individuals to internalize the social
norms of particular professions. 77 To illustrate, education in law im-
parts different skills, values, and professional norms than education in
accounting. A good audit requires more accuracy than creativity,
whereas a good plea sometimes requires more creativity than accu-
racy. While a responsible accountant is different from a responsible
lawyer, the professions complement each other in a modem
economy.
Unlike honesty, some behaviors benefit from normative diversity
rather than universality. For such behaviors, the morality that we most
prefer in others depends upon their occupational role. With regard
to professionals, people do not agree that a specific type of behavior is
universally best, but they may agree about the best behavior for a
given role.
75 As noted in footnote 46, supra, the Folk Theorem formulates the problem of
multiple equilibria.
76 For an explanation of Nash equilibria, see ERic RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 22-28 (2d ed. 1994).
77 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SociEm' 68-87 (W.D. Halls trans.,
1984); WEBER, supra note 60, at 27.
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This Article will not discuss occupational roles any further, except
to connect professional norms to signaling equilibria. Given consen-
sus over diversity, people in different occupational roles will provide
different signals about their competency and responsibility. The sig-
naling equilibrium will typically occur in the interior of the strategy
space, not at a corner. In the interior, the players balance marginal
benefits and costs, which are unbalanced at a corner. The second row
in Figure 2 indicates that, instead of being universally best, the respon-
sibilities associated with roles are relatively best, which generates an
interior signaling equilibrium.
3. Controversy
I have discussed forms of morality that generate consensus. Many
moral questions, however, cause disagreement and controversy.
Equality provides an example: people disagree over the extent to
which individuals ought to share their wealth with others. Disagree-
ment persists because individuals do not benefit from professing ad-
miration for the same thing. Poor people may hope to gain an
advantage by proclaiming that everyone ought to share wealth with
less fortunate people, but rich people gain little or no advantage from
professing that view.
In a business transaction (such as bargaining between the princi-
pal and agent over the latter's salary), soft bargaining is a public good
because it increases the probability of cooperation, whereas hard bar-
gaining is a public bad because it increases the probability of an im-
passe. In spite of this fact, a business community is unlikely to develop
a norm requiring soft bargaining. To drive a hard bargain, a player
must signal that he is a hard bargainer. People who represent them-
selves as hard bargainers are likely to defend hard bargaining in prin-
ciple. Consequently, many people will signal that they follow a hard-
bargaining strategy. Given this fact, no consensus will emerge that
people ought to "soft bargain." Instead of a consensus, a mixture of
opinions about the ethics of bargaining will mirror the mixture of
equilibrium strategies actually followed.
Moral disagreement causes contradictory signals among people
about what they ought to do. Contradictory signals often indicate the
absence of a signaling equilibrium. Instead of an equilibrium, differ-
ent ethical views may contend with each other for people's allegiance.
Thus, the third row in Figure 2 depicts equality as an example of a
value that elicits contradictory signals without a disequilibrium.
Whereas conventional morality concerns consensus obligations,
critical morality concerns contending values. Moral disagreement cre-
ates instability and provides part of the dynamic for social change.
Moral progress, such as women's suffrage and the abolition of slavery,
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occtrs when people advocating controversial values gain political
power and eventually succeed in creating a consensus in favor of their
views. A consensus over values restores a signaling equilibrium. The
rules of moral justification require much more elucidation in terms of
signaling theory than can be provided here.
IV
NoRMATIvE FAILuRE THEORY OF LAW
Having developed a model of morality, I will now provide a diag-
nostic tool for lawmakers by sketching a theory of normative failure. I
focus upon the type of normative failure that deficient informal pun-
ishment causes. I have argued that the effectiveness of a consensus
obligation depends especially upon informal punishment. When in-
formal punishments fail, social norms fail to emerge, or they emerge
and do not command enough obedience. To develop the analysis, I
distinguish different types of informal punishments, show how they
can fail, and explain how law can correct the failures.78
A. Types of Punishment
I will first distinguish three general types of wrongdoing with dis-
tinctive punishments. People often voluntarily transact with each
other, such as when they exchange goods, give gifts, or transmit infor-
mation. Boycotting is the logical opposite of transacting, so I call boy-
cotting the inherent sanction for transactional wrongdoing, as
depicted in the first row of Figure 3.
Figure 3: Sanction
activity inherent sanction reputational sanction
transact boycott blame
relate detach condemn
belong exclude; disdain denounce
People often form relationships with others, such as a business
partner, friend, or lover. Whereas transactions are discrete and may
occur only once, relationships necessarily endure, at least for awhile.
Social norms constrain behavior in relationships, channel the
expression of intrinsic values, and direct the flow of extrinsic benefits
and costs. The logical opposite of forming an attachment is
78 1 now use the term "normative failure theory of law." Formerly, I used the term
"structure theory of adjudication," because judges applying the theory of normative failure
to adjudicate a case will focus on the incentive structures by which social norms evolve. See
Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 38, at 1677-94.
[Vol. 82:947
NORMATIVE FAILURE THEORY OF LAW
detaching. Total detachment ends the relationship, whereas partial
detachment impairs it. In a voluntary relationship, the inherent
sanction for wrongdoing is detachment, as depicted in the second row
of Figure 3.
People often belong to formal or informal groups, such as a
circle of friends or a business organization. Social norms control
behavior in groups. Since exclusion from a group is the logical
opposite of belonging, I say that exclusion is the inherent sanction for
wrongdoing in a group, as depicted in the third row of Figure 3.
A person who advances the purposes and values of a group will
enjoy the esteem of its members. 79 Conversely, a person who
frustrates the purposes of a group or undermines its values will suffer
the disdain of its members. Most people intrinsically value esteem
and disdain, so a group can reward and punish its members by
modulating esteem and disdain. In Figure 3, I include "disdain" as an
inherent sanction of a group.
A person's reputation consists of the public's beliefs about his
history of conforming to social norms or violating them. Denouncing
the wrongdoer undermines his reputation with others, as depicted in
the third column of Figure 3. Inherent sanctions increase in
effectiveness when reputational sanctions supplement them. In
circumstances discussed later, reputational sanctions may succeed
where inherent sanctions fail.
This section distinguished transacting, relating, and belonging.
Sometimes these activities are separate from each other. For example,
withdrawing money from an automated teller machine is a transaction
without a relationship; romance is a relationship that may involve few
transactions; and working for the Post Office may involve group
membership with few relationships. More frequently, however, these
activities intermingle, as when belonging to a church involves
friendships that lead to business deals. When activities intermingle,
more than one kind of sanction may be at work in sustaining social
norms.
B. Effectiveness of Sanctions
Effective sanctions lead to successful social norms, whereas inef-
fective sanctions cause norms to fail. The different kinds of inherent
and reputational sanctions depicted in Figure 3 succeed and fail in
different situations. The analysis of these situations reveals important
ways in which informal punishments fail.
Relationships that endure over time provide many opportunities
for the parties to reward and punish each other. Detachment pun-
79 See McAdams, supra note 17, at 1019-21.
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ishes the wrongdoer by depriving him of the relationship's value. The
severity of this punishment depends upon the availability of substi-
tutes. If the relationship is unique and no substitutes exist, the pun-
ishment is severe. Conversely, if the relationship is common and close
substitutes exist, the punishment is mild.
To illustrate detachment, the victim of wrongdoing may direct
business away from a partner, cool a friendship, or develop interests
outside a marriage. The punishment is severe if the wrongdoer has
no other partners, friends, or interests, whereas the punishment is
mild if the wrongdoer has many other partners, friends, or interests.
The first row in Figure 4 depicts these situations.
Figure 4: Effectiveness of Sanction
activity sanction condition for effective sanction
relate detach no close substitutes
transact once denounce stern reputation deters
belong denounce integration, credibility
Turning from relationships to transactions, the victim of
wrongdoing in a transaction often refuses to trade or communicate
with the wrongdoer in the future. Boycotting the wrongdoer punishes
him by reducing his opportunities for advantageous transactions. In
transactions based on relationships, a boycott by the victim sharply
punishes the wrongdoer by destroying the expected value from future
transactions. In one-shot transactions, however, the parties do not
anticipate future dealings with each other, so a boycott by one victim
hardly affects the wrongdoer. To be effective, the reputational
sanctions that the few victims use must induce many people to impose
inherent sanctions.
For many kinds of transactions, potential victims will heed a
credible warning. In these circumstances, a potential difficulty
concerns the incentives to warn. Sullying the injurer's reputation
often involves confrontation or retaliation, and consumes time and
effort. The person who does the denouncing usually balances these
costs against the benefit of gaining a stern reputation, which deters
future injuries.
The benefits of informal punishment are partly internalized and
partly externalized. The victim who denounces the injurer
internalizes the benefits of a stern reputation and externalizes the
benefits of the warning to other potential victims. Insofar as the
victim of a transactional wrong internalizes all of the cost of
denouncing the injurer and externalizes some of the benefits, victims
may devote too little effort to denouncing injurers. In general, people
[Vol. 82:947
NORMATIVE FAILURE THEORY OF LAW
tend to free-ride on others' efforts to enforce social norms.8 0 To
overcome free-riding in enforcing transactional morality, a stern
reputation must have high deterrence value, as indicated in the
second row of Figure 4.
Groups provide a context for relationships and transactions, such
as neighbors becoming friends and making deals. Social norms
regulate these relationships and transactions. In addition, groups
have their own distinctive social norms and associated punishments. I
will focus on inherent values of the group, such as prestige and
esteem, and consider the corresponding conditions for effective
punishment. Organized groups may have formal rules and
punishments. I will focus on unorganized groups with informal rules
and punishments.
When a wrongdoer injures a group, the effects diffuse among its
members. For example, pollution may harm a neighborhood, not
merely a particular individual. Similarly, disloyalty to friends may
undermine their ability to cooperate with each other. No individual
in the group has much incentive to bear the risks and costs of
punishing wrongs that cause diffuse harm. In general, diffuse harm
undermines individual incentives to deter it, so individuals tend to
free-ride on the enforcement efforts of others.
To be effective, informal enforcement of diffuse harm must be
very cheap, like gossip. Denouncing a member of a group is often
cheap, especially when done indirectly or confidentially. Denouncing
the wrongdoer reduces his esteem and may cause others in the group
to disdain him. As depicted in the last row of Figure 4, fear of disdain
can deter wrongdoers who are integrated into the group, so that they
desire the group's esteem. If the wrongdoers are not integrated into
the group, disdain will have little deterrent power.
I explained that a group setting aggravates the problem of free-
riding on informal punishments by others. Rivalry and competition
partly overcome this problem. Esteem in a group can be redistributed
among rivals. The person in the group who gains most from
denouncing a wrongdoer is his rival. Thus, rivalry performs the useful
function of overcoming the free-rider problem in informal
enforcement of social norms.
Rivalry, however, aggravates another problem with informal
punishment-credibility. If the injurer and the denouncer are rivals,
80 I focus on under-enforcement by informal means, which is common. Over-
enforcement, however, is also possible. Over-enforcement by informal means occurs when
enforcement redirects wrongdoing without deterring it. To illustrate by analogy, if bars on
the windows redirect burglars without changing the total number of burglaries, then.
installing bars conveys a private advantage but not a social advantage.
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people may not believe the denunciation.8 1 In any case, overcoming
the credibility problem depends on the neutrality of the speaker, or
on the observability of the alleged facts.
The problem of free-riding and credibility with respect to
informal enforcement provides an incentive for groups to organize.
Organizational structure can ameliorate these problems. For
example, an organization may have procedures for censoring or
expelling members. Procedures improve credibility and broadcast
denunciations more widely.
C. Four Types of Normative Failure
Figure 4 depicts conditions for the effectiveness of informal pun-
ishments. To develop a theory of legal order built on social order, I
want to move from "effectiveness" to "perfection." In the study of
markets, "efficiency" for economists means either Pareto efficiency or
cost-benefit efficiency.8 2 I adopt the same meanings of perfection in
the study of social norms. Social norms are "perfect" when law cannot
improve upon them relative to these standards of efficiency. When
social norms are perfect, enacting a law creates an inefficiency.
The problem the normative failure theory of law faces is to spec-
ify conditions under which the structure of social interaction results in
perfect social norms. The model of morality developed above is the
beginning of such a theory. As explained, typical conditions for nor-
mative perfection include a uniform signaling equilibrium and a pun-
ishment-induced equilibrium. The uniform signal must provide
optimal precision and clarity about what people ought to do. Clarity
and precision are optimal when no improvement can be made in
communicating the obligatory act. In addition, the social norm must
have a punishment-induced equilibrium with an efficient level of de-
terrence. I have discussed in detail the conditions for effective pun-
ishment. Perfection goes beyond effectiveness, to the point where the
state cannot improve upon the level of deterrence that informal
means achieve.
Although this Article cannot develop a complete account of per-
fect social norms, the preceding analysis suggests some salient condi-
tions for perfect informal sanctions. I will now discuss these
conditions for relationships, transactions, and groups.
81 Psychologists have investigated various perceptual distortions. To illustrate, more
than 50% of drivers consider themselves to be above average. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 ST'AN. L. REv. 211, 216 (1995); JeffreyJ.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 118 (1996).
Apparently, psychologists have not investigated distortions in how people perceive their
rivals.
82 SeeJules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HorsTRA L. Rxv.
509 (1980).
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A relationship is "perfect" if the parties cooperate fully and maxi-
mizejoint value, without harming outsiders. Research in game theory
shows that a relationship tends towards this kind of perfection when
the parties expect it to persist. The potential advantage from the per-
sistence of a relationship is large when its joint value exceeds the
amount available in the next best alternative to the relationship. The
absence of substitutes gives the parties a strong reason to sustain the
relationship. Equivalently, the parties pay a sharp price for ending a
relationship that lacks close substitutes.
This analysis suggests a diagnosis for failed relationships. Rela-
tionships fail because close substitutes erode the power to punish
wrongdoing. The availability of close substitutes prevents the parties
from solving agency problems through strategies such as "tit-for-tat."83
To restore perfection, the parties must strengthen their commitment
to each other, thus making substitution harder. The parties commit
by making relation-specific investments, which are more valuable in-
side the relationship than outside it.
An unobtrusive public policy to avoid failed relationships might
promote relation-specific investment, as depicted in the first row of
Figure 5. To illustrate, the agent's duties owed to the principal may
be too vague and contingent to specify in their contract. In this cir-
cumstance, the law may impose a "duty of loyalty" upon the agent.
Loyalty concerns moral obligations, not precise duties.8 4 The duty of
loyalty requires a commitment by the agent to the principal, which
raises barriers against exit. Thus, the duty of loyalty promotes rela-
tion-specific investment.
Similarly, a buyer and a seller may need to make specialized in-
vestments in reliance upon each other. If cost variability precludes
them from making a long-run contract with definite terms, the parties
may want to commit to an enduring relationship with indefinite
terms. To facilitate commitment, the parties may create a contract
requiring the courts to impose sanctions on either party who under-
mines the relationship by, say, refusing to negotiate in good faith or
dealing with a third-party competitor.
Another example comes from labor mobility in Japan. Executives
change companies in Japan less often than in other countries, in part
because the workers reject leaders coming over from other compa-
nies.85 The high cost of exiting the firm apparently precludes substi-
83 For an explanation of tit-for-tat in game theory, see AXELROD, supra note 10, at 13-
14.
84 See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1053-56 (1991).
85 The specific mechanisms of this argument are described in Michael Hechter &
Satoshi Kanazawa, Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan, 5 J. THEOREnCAL POL. 455
(1993). For cautions against making sweeping generalizations based on the data, see
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tuting one set of relationships for another. The absence of substitutes
enhances the power of informal norms to induce cooperation without
using formal contracts.8 6
Figure 5: Diagnosing Failed Sanctions
Sanction Cause of Sanction's Remedy
Failure
boycott close substitutes relationship specific investment
raise exit costs
denounce insufficient broadcast stigmatize
disdain alienation socialize
disdain costly confrontation focal point for solidarity
Now I turn from relationships to transactions. As with
relationships, a transaction is "perfect" if the parties maximize joint
value without harming outsiders. In imperfect transactions, one party
destroys joint value in order to redistribute value to himself. Social
norms constrain acts that destroy joint value. As discussed above,
informal enforcement of transactional norms relies upon reputational
sanctions. To make wrongdoing unprofitable, the victim of
transactional wrongdoing must warn others against the injurer. Thus,
a salient condition for perfect enforcement is full broadcast of
information about wrongdoing.
This analysis suggests a diagnosis for failed transactions. The
victims of wrongdoing broadcast the information in order to acquire a
stern reputation. Acquiring a stern reputation can deter future
wrongs. Therefore, the victim balances broadcast costs against the
value of a stern reputation. Informal punishment of transactional
wrongs fails when broadcasting costs too much relative to the value of
a stern reputation. One remedy is to lower the cost of stigmatizing
wrongdoers, as depicted in the second row of Figure 5.
To illustrate, local newspapers sometimes publish the names of
persons convicted of drunk driving. Daniel Kahan has proposed
systematic shaming of criminals.8 7 Another illustration comes from
employment practices. An employer who discharges an unsatisfactory
employee and refuses to give the person a reference for another job
will acquire a stern reputation. A stern reputation discourages
KAzuO KoiKE, UNDERSTANDING INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS IN MODERN JAPAN 266-67 (Mary Saso
trans., 1988).
86 See generally Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, Cultural Attitudes Towards Contract
Law: Japan and the United States Compared, 2 UCLA PAc. BAsIN LJ. 76 (1983) (describing
Japanese informal contracts).
87 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 631-
34 (1996).
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unsatisfactory workers from seeking employment with the employer.
Recently, however, American companies have sometimes rid
themselves of unsatisfactory employees by providing a good (but false)
reference in exchange for the employee's resignation, thus escaping a
suit for wrongful discharge.88 Inaccurate references aggravate the
problems of information that undermine social norms and afflict
labor markets.8 9
Now I turn from transactions to groups. I will focus on how
groups use norms to control the supply of public goods and bads. As
with relationships and transactions, a group is "perfect" in the relevant
sense if the parties maximize joint value without harming outsiders.
Specifically, a perfect group induces an efficient supply of public
goods and bads. To achieve this end, the group must reach a
consensus concerning the obligations of individuals with respect to
public goods and bads, and then enforce those obligations. I will
discuss enforcement but not consensus formation.
Members of a group suffer disdain and enjoy esteem from others.
Besides detaching and boycotting, groups can enforce obligations by
modulating disdain and esteem. Specifically, the people who observe
wrongdoing can broadcast the facts, thus lowering the injurer's
esteem in the eyes of the group. This suggests that a perfect informal
group controls public goods and bads through esteem-modulating
norms. Conversely, an informal group fails when it cannot enforce its
norms by modulating esteem.
Disdain cannot deter alienated group members, who care little
about the group's judgments. Social control can break down because
disdain fails to deter wrongdoers. Better socialization reduces
alienation, which restores the sting of disdain, as described in the
third row of Figure 5. To illustrate, better integration of alienated
youth into society combats street crime by making youth more
responsive to social judgments.
From the group's standpoint, the ideal modulation of disdain
and esteem motivates the efficient supply of public goods and bads.
Unfortunately, the economic analysis of the optimal allocation of
disdain and esteem is underdeveloped. No one has formulated the
88 For an analysis of the emergence of the tort of wrongful discharge, see John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation,
43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 983-1000 (1991); see also John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on
Unemployment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523
(1987) (addressing criticism of Title VII);JohnJ. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination
in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1337 (1989) (discussing the
desirability of antidiscrimination laws).
89 See, e.g., Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 880 F. Supp. 380, 383-85 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(refusing to grant summary judgment to a school district that allowed a teacher who had
sexually molested a student to resign and gave a "satisfactory" reference to his future
employer), modified, 914 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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general conditions under which a spontaneous, informal assignment
of esteem will be better than a more formal, explicit assignment.90
To appreciate the problem, consider honors and awards. For
example, Britain acknowledges greatness by awarding peerages, which
many Englishmen apparently value more than wealth. Similarly,
many corporations try to motivate workers by designating the "best
employee of the month." Formal honors and prizes clearly
distinguish between winners and losers. Economists, however, have
not formulated the conditions under which formal honors and prizes
improve upon the motivation that an informal system of esteem
creates.
Competition for esteem creates another problem for informal
punishment-credibility. I already discussed the credibility problem
that occurs when someone denounces a rival. Forming an
organization in order to provide some guarantee of objectivity can
address this problem. To illustrate, diamond exchanges organize
their members and police their transactions. When a merchant court
finds that one member has cheated another, the wrongdoer may be
excluded from the exchange and his picture may be posted in
exchanges throughout the world.91 The merchant court's fact-finding
process creates credibility, and posting the wrongdoer's picture
facilitates a boycott.
Diffusion of the benefits and costs of public goods and bads
aggravates the problem of free-riding on the enforcement of
consensus obligations. Informal enforcement often risks a costly
confrontation, but this risk falls dramatically when an entire group
joins in the denunciation. Solidarity reduces the individual's cost of
enforcement. Solidarity requires coordinating the expectations of the
norm's enforcers. Coordination of expectations can occur through a
focal point, as described in the fourth row of Figure 5.
To illustrate a legal focal point, the City of Berkeley recently
enacted an ordinance requiring owners to clean up after their dogs (a
"pooper-scooper" law). Enactment of the law clarified vague social
norms concerning courtesy and signaled majority support for
enforcement. After the law was passed, people became more
aggressive toward discourteous dog owners. Apparently it is easier to
say, "Obey the law" than to say, "Don't be so rude." Similarly, in the
90 The rudimentary level of thought was chronicled in an exchange on the economics
of prizes that occurred during the winter of 1996 on the George Mason Law and
Economics e-mail bulletin board. A recent book argues that giving prizes for relative
performance creates incentives for excessive work, thus turning jobs into rat races. See
ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIPJ. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SocimY 7-11 (1995). A recent
article has analyzed racial discrimination as the natural outcome of groups seeking to
benefit from the organization of status. See McAdams, supra note 17.
91 See Bernstein, Diamond Industy, supra note 14, at 126-28, 149-50.
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recent past, Americans smoked at will in many public buildings, and
nonsmokers seldom complained. After most local governments
enacted ordinances prohibiting smoking in public buildings, officials
posted "no smoking" signs, but almost never enforced the
prohibitions. Perhaps the officials believed, correctly, that other
nonsmokers would complain to smokers. Enacting the ordinances
apparently tipped the balance in favor of private enforcement of the
social norm.
The "pooper-scooper" and "no-smoking" examples can be
analyzed in terms of multiple equilibria and tipping points.92 In
general, interdependency in enforcement costs creates an instability
that causes enforcement to jump from low to high levels, or vice versa.
Under certain conditions, if most citizens believe that most other
citizens will enforce the social norm, then the system will move to the
stable internal equilibrium with a high level of enforcement. The
mere enactment of a law can dramatically reduce the cost of
confrontation to an individual who enforces the underlying
obligation. Conversely, if most citizens believe that few other citizens
will enforce the social norm, then the system will move to the stable
corner equilibrium with a low level of enforcement. In such a social
system, state enactment can sometimes tip society into conformity
with the law merely by causing citizens to believe correctly that most of
them will enforce it.
My analysis has focused upon failures of informal punishment.
Now I will briefly mention some other problems that arise when
groups interact with each other-monopoly and group externality.
Within a group, social norms may arise that benefit its members at the
expense of nonmembers. These social norms generate a consensus
within the group of beneficiaries, but not within the group of victims.
Groups often create norms that benefit their members by reducing
competition with people outside the group. Norms that suppress
competition create a kind of social cartel. These social cartels are
subject to the same analysis as economic cartels. Like business cartels,
social cartels suffer from inherent instability, which lawmakers can
exploit.
To illustrate, consider the problem of discrimination in labor
markets. Discriminatory norms typically involve behavior by social
groups resembling rules that regulate dealing among members of
business cartels. As with all cartels, a person belonging to a group of
discriminators often gains an advantage by breaking the norm without
detection. This advantage consists of the opportunity to transact
more broadly, rather than being restricted to certain transactions
92 See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 38, at 1669-75.
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among group members. The law can destabilize discriminatory
cartels by protecting from the group's punishment those members
who "cheat" by violating the group norms requiring discrimination. 93
The final form of normative failure occurs when a group permits
its members to externalize costs on outsiders. For example, a village
located upstream from other villages may permit its members to
pollute at points below the village, thus imposing pollution on
downstream villages. In effect, the social norm says, "You may not
pollute upstream from our village, but you may pollute downstream
from our village." This case involves a spillover.
I have explained at length that social norms arise within a group
to control the harm that one person can cause to another. Consensus
social norms, however, are less likely to evolve to regulate interactions
between groups. This is an area where critical morality can play an
important role. Another mechanism economists stress is bargaining.
Applied to relations among groups, the Coase Theorem asserts that
bargaining will solve spillovers, provided that transaction costs do not
excessively burden bargaining.94 A remedy for spillovers is lowering
the transaction cost of bargaining between groups. Reduction in
transaction costs requires organization and representation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Law often grows from social norms that create order from con-
sensus obligations. I model a consensus obligation as a uniform sig-
nal, and I measure the effect of a consensus obligation by a change in
equilibrium behavior. Individuals committed to one moral norm
often compete with uncommitted individuals or with individuals com-
mitted to a different morality. Models of morality explain how moral
commitment can persist in competition with noncommitment. Ineffi-
cient equilibria indicate failures in the system of norms. Characteriz-
ing failures guides and justifies the making of law.
In a democracy, justifications for coercive law are usually
grounded in the majorities' power to legitimize. The theory this Arti-
cle develops, however, provides a nonmajoritarianjustification of law.
Instead of using majorities, this theory justifies law by consensus. This
consensus concerns obligations embedded in social norms. Norma-
tive failure theory identifies the causes of failure in social norms,
where "failure" refers to inefficiency as measured by the Pareto stan-
dard or the cost-benefit standard. When social norms fail, the state
can sometimes improve upon the situation. Normative failure theory
93 See generally Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SA DIEGO L. Ray. 133
(1994) (arguing that state antidiscrimination laws and protections undermine
discriminatory cartels).
94 Coase, supra note 20, at 15.
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identifies effective means of state intervention. Notice that none of
the remedies proposed in Figure 5 involves state coercion. Instead,
the remedies require strengthening informal norms.
Consensus can solve some persistent problems in political theory.
For example, consensus represents something like actual consent,
rather than the hypothetical consent that figures prominently in con-
tractarian theories such as Rawls's Theory of Justice.95 A problem that
plagues majority rule is intransitivity, as Arrow's impossibility theorem
demonstrates so forcefully. 96 Consensus, however, does not suffer
from the paradoxes of majority rule. Social norms based on consensus
reveal order, not incoherence.
Normative failure theory also has practical implications for law-
making, notably in the business law context. In a competitive econ-
omy with relatively free trade, business will tend to develop efficient
norms to regulate private interactions. In these circumstances, the
role of state law can be limited to correcting failures in the market for
norms. Failures tend to occur because private, informal punishment
insufficiently deters wrongdoing. In these circumstances, state en-
forcement of social norms can increase private cooperation and
production.
According to Locke, the state can provide more certain and se-
cure enforcement.97 State enforcement is more certain because a
written law provides a canonical formulation of the underlying obliga-
tion and, in an ideal situation, courts apply the rule with impartiality.
Additionally, state enforcement is more secure because of the state's
monopoly on official use of force.
In reality, private enforcement and state enforcement typically
complement each other. By cooperating with officials, citizens lower
the cost and increase the effectiveness of state enforcement. Con-
versely, the effectiveness of private enforcement increases, and its risks
to private enforcers decrease, when state officials support and supple-
ment private enforcers. Successful state enforcement typically re-
quires a close alignment of law with morality, so state officials enjoy
informal support from private persons.
95 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
96 KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 1963).
97 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CnL GoWFRNMNT 63-64 (J.W. Gough ed.,
3d ed. 1966) (1690).
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